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The Effect of Block Ownership on Future Firm Value and Performance 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the performance of the investment decisions of block owners. 
The block ownership data is obtained from Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick 
(2006). We find that firm valuation (measured by Tobin's Q), operating performance 
(measured by changes in return on assets) and stock performance (measured by excess buy 
and hold returns) are positively and significantly related to the previous years' level of block 
ownership both in terms of the size of the ownership and the number of blockholders. Our 
results are robust to endogeneity concerns. Regarding whether a specific blockholder is an 
"insider" or an "outsider" to the firm, we find that the ownership of "outside" blockholders is 
a key determinant in explaining future firm performance. Note though that this category 
makes up about two-thirds of the aggregate amount of blockholding in Dlugosz et al. (2006) 
database, and also includes all blockholders not classified in other categories. In general, we 
attribute the superior performance to the presence of more blockholders. We also find an 
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The Effect of Block Ownership on Future Firm Value and Performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Holderness (2009) states that “relatively little research addresses ownership by all large-
percentage shareholders, which differs from inside ownership to the extent that large 
shareholders are not directors or officers.” This study attempts to address Holderness’s 
concerns by investigating the effect of different levels of block ownership as well as the 
various forms of inside and outside ownership on a number of aspects of corporate 
performance and value. A blockholder is defined as an entity that owns five percent or more 
of a company’s shareholding. We also address the call of Ducassy and Montandrau (2015) 
for further and more in-depth research investigation on ownership structure and their 
influence on the firm from a financial perspective. 
Since the work of Berle and Means (1932), ownership concentration has become a 
key area of research in the field of corporate governance (see Kumar and Zattoni, 2015). One 
of the issues being highlighted in this sphere is that large blockholders positively affect firm 
value. Blockholders will help minimize the agency problem between the managers and the 
owners of the firm. This is particularly important as the diffused shareholders with smaller 
holdings in the firm are unlikely to help monitor the firm. Proponents of large blockholders 
suggest that this group provides a voice―for example, by limiting managerial discretion―to 
minimize agency costs and to increase firm value (see, for example, Schleifer and Vishny, 
1986 ). 
In contrast to the presence of a single large blockholder to enhance firm value, 
academics also argue that large blockholders can expropriate wealth from small shareholders, 
which should adversely affect the firm value as large blockholders try to seek private benefits 
  
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002). As the role of a large blockholder 
is treated differently depending on whether they are classified as either an insider or an 
outsider, Demsetz and Lehn (1985 ) caution that regressions of firm value and performance 
are fraught with endogeneity concerns. We address such issues as explained in the 
methodology section.  
We use the classification of block ownership by Dlugosz et al. (2006), i.e., affiliated; 
nonofficer director; Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOP), officer director and outside 
blockholder to examine how corporate performance is linked to the shareholdings of the 
various categories of blockholders. We measure different aspects of performance, i.e., using 
Tobin's Q to assess valuation, changes in return on asset to measure operating performance 
and buy and hold returns in excess of the Standard & Poor’s S&P500 Index to measure stock 
performance. 
The current study is based on a sample of 1,658 firms listed in the United States 
(U.S.) over the period 1996 to 2001. The advantage of using Dlugosz et al. (2006) is that 
several cleaning measures have been already applied to ensure their robustness and reliability 
(e.g., Chen and Yur-Austin, 2007; Konijn et al., 2011) to enable us to examine the 
relationship between block ownership and firm value and performance using multivariate 
analyses. We choose to conduct our analysis in the U.S. context for two main reasons. First, it 
is well documented that institutional investors dominate corporate ownership in the US. 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) associate the differences between individual and institutional 
investors to the legal environment in which institutional investors have a fiduciary role. The 
Prudent-Man principle has facilitated such a role in the U.S. since 1974 (Longstreth, 1986 ). 
Second, the U.S. market is characterized as having a highly diffuse pattern of share 
ownership, which Berle and Means (1932) described as the ‘separation of ownership and 
control.’ Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined this conflict through the agency theory where 
  
the firm represents a nexus of contracts between the principals and agents. Despite diffused 
ownership, Holderness (2009) states that controlling shareholders exert a great deal of 
influence on corporate governance. According to Edmans (2014), the definition of 
blockholder is ambiguous, but empirical research uses the 5% ownership level as the 
threshold to identify block shareholders (similar to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act requirements for mandatory public disclosure of ownership in the U.S. 
(Morck et al., 1988 )). 
Our analysis yields several interesting findings. We find that firm valuation (measured 
by Tobin's Q), operating performance (measured by changes in return on assets) and stock 
performance (measured by excess buy and hold returns) are positively and significantly 
related to the previous years' level of block ownership both in terms of the size of the 
ownership and the number of blockholders. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns. 
Regarding whether a specific blockholder is an "insider" or an "outsider" to the firm, we find 
that the ownership of "outside" blockholders is a critical determinant in explaining future 
firm performance. Note though that this category makes up about two-thirds of the aggregate 
amount of blockholding in Dlugosz et al. (2006) database, and also includes all blockholders 
not classified in other categories. Thus, we attribute the superior performance to the presence 
of more blockholders generally. 
We also demonstrate the importance of the stability of blockownership. More 
precisely, we test the effect of the volatility in the annual blockownership on ex-post firm 
performance. We find the association to be negative, i.e., the higher the volatility in the 
blockownership, the lower is the firm performance in the following year. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We review the literature and formulate the 
hypotheses in the next section. Data collection is explained in Section 3. Our methods are 
  
explained in Section 4. Findings and discussions are presented in Section 5. The final section 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Following Dlugosz et al. (2006 ), we classify blockholders into five groups, i.e., non-officer 
director blockholders, Employee Shareholder Ownership Plan (ESOP), affiliated 
blockholders, officer blockholders and outside blockholders, respectively. Below, we develop 
our hypothesis by linking corporate performance to each blockholder category. 
 
2.1 Non-officer Director blockholders 
On the whole, previous research on block ownership could be split into two main areas. The 
first area covers outside ownership, excluding all categories of insiders as well as a firm’s 
officers (e.g., Edmans, 2014; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Smith, 1996; Woidtke, 2002). The 
second area covers insider ownership (e.g., Akbar et al., 2016; Bushee 2001; Goranova et al., 
2007; Wahba, 2015). Overall, the findings are mixed, and this could be because different 
categories of blockowners exert distinct effects on firm performance. 
Besides their focus on firm performance, blockholders are widely linked to corporate 
monitoring and governance. Research shows that large blockholders are able to monitor 
managers and provide better control over managers’ behavior, which attenuates agency cost 
(Edmans, Fang and Zur, 2013; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In a 
recent study by Kaya and Lumpkin-Sowers (2017), the authors assert that measures of sound 
governance are likely to be correlated with the type of blockholders. Based on this notion 
they divided blockholders into five categories like Dlugosz et al. (2006 ) and examined if the 
ownership stake of each blockholder group changes when the economy turns into a recession 
  
as in 2001 following a state of expansion in 1999. We add to the literature by linking 
expected firm performance with blockownership. 
 Dharwadkar et al. (2008) argue that the portfolio effect of large institutional investors 
should be included alongside firm-level variables due to their influence on the level of 
executive compensation as well as their effectiveness as corporate monitors. Their results 
further indicate a positive association between portfolio blockholding and pay for 
performance. Interestingly, Dharwadkar et al.’s findings do not support that large stock 
owners have more effect on portfolios of large firms (Ryan and Schneider, 2002). Instead, 
Dharwadkar et al. show that large investors are better at monitoring small firms in which they 
have a significant stake. In their concluding remarks, Dharwadkar et al. (2008) echo 
Hoskisson et al.’s (2002) argument to consider the different types of block owners in 
examinations of the relationship between the size of blockholder ownership and investee firm 
performance. 
The limited research on how various groups of inside blockholders are likely to affect 
firm performance is more evident when the relationship between firm performance and non-
officer stock ownership is considered. This can be explained by Edmans (2014) assertion that 
non-officers are difficult to identify either as insiders or outsiders because of their role and the 
way they engage in firm governance. Among the few papers that attempted to address this 
issue is Bhagat and Tookes (2012), who show that holding stocks voluntarily by outside 
directors is positively related with firm performance while mandatory ownership is not linked 
to corporate performance. As non-officers and outside directors exert less managerial 
responsibilities and governance powers, it is appropriate to treat them as a distinct group of 
block owners. Therefore, in this study, we consider non-officers as a separate blockholder 
category, which is likely to affect firm performance, and hypothesize that: 
  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Firm performance is positively correlated with the size of the 
non-officer director blockholders’ ownership.  
 
2.2 ESOP and affiliated blockholders 
“Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and affiliated groups” is the second typical 
category of blockholders who own shares in a firm. The literature on ESOP dates back to 
Louis Kelso
6
 in 1956, who designed the first employee stock ownership plan in the U.S. 
(Hetter, 1977).  
Outside the U.S., and using quantile regression on a sample of Taiwanese firms, Kuo 
and Yu (2013) debate that while issuing equity options incentivizes employees to maximize 
corporate welfare, yet the dilution in existing shareholders’ ownership caused by the exercise 
of equity options acts as a disincentive. They further find that the association between 
employee stock ownership and stock returns depends on the firm’s prior performance. 
Brockman and Yan (2009) empirical results show no direct relationship between ESOP 
and firm-specific return. Though, when insiders are treated as one group, a positive 
relationship is found between their ownership and firm-specific return. Other researchers, 
such as Kaya and Lumpkin-Sowers (2017), state that employees’ stock ownership is likely to 
change in an economic recession due to their unique characteristics (including how they 
perceive the element of risk and future cash flows) leading many scholars to treat ESOP as a 
separate blockholder group in their research methodology. They also note that in theory ESOP 
has less access to information and lower ability to monitor the firm compared to other 
blockholders. In line with Kaya and Lumpkin-Sowers (2017), we treat ESOP and affiliated 
investors separately from other blockholders’ types in their ability to affect firm performance. 
We hypothesize that: 
                                                 
6
 http://kelsoinstitute.org/louiskelso/kelso-paradigm/who-what-and-why/(accessed 1 October 2018). 
  
HYPOTHESIS 2a: Firm performance is positively correlated with the size of 
ESOP blockholders ownership.  
HYPOTHESIS 2b: Firm performance is positively correlated with the size of 
affiliated blockholders ownership. 
 
2.3 Officer Director blockholders 
The positive relationship between directors or officers’ stock ownership and firm 
performance is widely documented in the literature (see, for example, Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996 and Morck, et al., 1988). McLaughlin et al. (1996) note that the increase in firm value is 
due to managers becoming less entrenched, while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) state 
incentives as a factor for the increase in firm value. Comparable to Bhagat et al. (2008), 
various studies document a non-linear relationship between the shareholdings of insider 
blockholders and performance, i.e., increases in performance due to increases in ownership 
are more noteworthy at lower levels of ownership than higher levels (also see Morck et al., 
1988). 
Bhagat and Tookes (2012) find that the directors’ holdings exert a positive impact on a 
firm’s return on assets. Nonetheless, Lins (2003) find that firms subject to high control rights 
by managers as opposed to cash flow rights create less value for shareholders; more cash 
flow inducements would assist in creating value. Firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, is 
also influenced by managerial ownership (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Lins, 2003). 
This leads us to infer that firm performance is likely to be affected by the size of officers’ 
ownership and, therefore, we hypothesize that:   




2.4 Outside blockholders ownership 
Sias et al. (2001) find that stock return is less correlated with institutional ownership while 
Cornett et al. (2007) document a positive association between institutional investors’ 
ownership level and firm cash flow return. La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) 
also find a positive connection between firm value and the level of cash flow rights of large 
shareholders. The positive correlation between outside ownership and firm performance is 
based on the premise that an increase in the ownership of large investors pressurizes firms’ 
managers to adopt investment and financing policies that contribute to a rise in earnings, an 
increase in assets’ cash flow return and, ultimately, to high share prices. In a seminal work, 
Bushee (1998, 2001) splits stock owners to “transient,” and fiduciary standard type of 
institutional investors and states that managers are more prone to pursuing short-term earning 
strategies rather than focus on creating long-term value through research and development 
(R&D). More recently, Erenburg et al. (2016) note that prior literature on the relationship 
between institutional holdings and firm performance are divided between the roles of 
institutional investors as either “influence-based” or “non-influence-based.” The former 
suggesting causality and the latter is archetypal to a positive relationship between the share 
ownership size and performance. These assertions lead to the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Firm performance is positively correlated with outside 
blockholders ownership. 
 
We have identified two conceptual issues with direct relevance to the study aims and 
objectives: firm performance and blockholders ownership structure. Using the theoretical and 
empirical works of other scholars in this field of research (e.g. Aslan and Kumar, 2012; 
Coles, Lemmon and Meschke, 2012; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Edmans and Manso, 2011; 
Schleifer and Vishny, 1986; Wintoki et al. 2012) we provide the context on which we have 
dealt with each of these areas. 
  
The initial step we have taken in this study is selecting the right financial measures of 
firm performance. Although, as noted in the previous section, the majority of scholars used 
TOBIN_Q as an indicator of firm performance, other financial measures cannot be dismissed 
for at least three reasons. First, TOBIN_Q is considered to be forward-looking while other 
financial measures, such as ROA, are backward looking. It enables us to assess both what the 
firm has achieved and what the managers are endeavoring to attain. Second, TOBIN_Q is 
affected by investor expectations while other financial measures are not (see Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) on the limitations of using TOBIN_Q). Third, economic indicators provide 
a different picture of the firm performance supporting the view presented by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) that relying, for example, on TOBIN_Q as the only denominator, results in 
ignoring intangible assets that contribute into providing a misleading picture about firm 
performance. 
In this study, we use a firm’s Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q), changes in annual return on 
asset (ΔROA) and one-year buy and hold return in excess of the return on the S&P500 index 
(EXCESS_BHR) as our performance measures. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and 
Dlugosz et al. (2006), TOBIN_Q is used as a proxy for firm value (also see, Chung and Pruitt 
(1994)). Morck et al. (1988) find that TOBIN_Q for the Fortune 500 firms varies with 
managerial ownership. In this study, we predict that TOBIN_Q will increase with the 
percentage level of ownership of blockholders, as managers would be under pressure to 
pursue strategies that increase firm value. 
ROA is an accounting-based performance measure, and according to Erenburg 
(2016), ROA is a suitable measure for established firms, and “minimizes known biases of 
ROA as a performance measure.” The ROA is used to avoid any influence on return due to 
the capital structure of the firm. As argued earlier, we test the hypothesis that block 
ownership affects firms' ROA. 
  
Firms further benefit from investments by long-term and stable buy and hold investors 
(Connelly et al., 2010). Bushee (1998) distinguish between “quasi-indexers” and “dedicated” 
investors, who both adopt a long-term orientation to stock investment.
7
 Both groups are 
characterized as having low turnover and a long holding period. They are distinctive since the 
“quasi-indexers” hold well-diversified portfolios and adopt a passive buy and hold strategy 
while the “dedicated” investors hold large investments at target firms (Connelly et al., 2010; 




3. Data  
The block ownership dataset is obtained from Dlugosz et al. (2006) and covers the 
sample period 1996 to 2001. There are 1658 firms and 6574 firm-year observations. The 
panel data set is unbalanced. The distribution of the sample is presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Block ownership definition is based on the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 rule 
13d-1(a), which considers block ownership as a person or an entity that owns more than 5% 
of the shares outstanding in a company (Edmans, 2014). 
 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
We test the effect of the sum of share ownership by all blockholders (SUMBLKS) on next 
year's firm performance. We also examine the impact of the total number of blockholders 
                                                 
7
 The positive effects of institutional ownership on corporate governance is well documented in the literature, 
for instance, Dugall and Millar (1999); Jory and Ngo (2016); Farooqi et al. (2017); Jory et al. (2017a, b); among 
others. 
8
 As argued earlier, a further theoretical consideration adopted in the present study is the use of an 
appropriate firm ownership structure (e.g., Aslan and Kumar, 2012; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). Segregating between inside and outside blockholders is a popular method in assessing the link 
between block ownership and firm performance (also see Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). For example, given 
their insider influence, managerial ownership (i.e., insider ownership) should be treated differently from outside 
block owners. 
  
(NUMBLKS). Separately, the dataset allows us to analyze the effects of the following 
subgroups of block owners: (1) percentage of share ownership by all blockholders 
(SUMBLKS); (2) percentage of shares held by all affiliated blockholders (SUMAFLIN); (3) 
percentage of share ownership by all non-officer director blockholders (SUMDIR); (4) 
percentage of shares held by all ESOP-related blockholders (SUMESOP); (5) percentage of 
shares ownership by all officer blockholders (SUMOFF); and (6) percentage of shares held 
by all outside blockholders (SUMOUT). These categories are also presented and measured in 
numbers as follows: (i) number of all blockholders (NUMBLKS); (ii) number of affiliated 
blockholders (NUMAFLIN); (iii) number of non-officer director blockholders (NUMDIR); 
(iv) number of ESOP related blockholders (NUMESOP); (v) number of officer blockholders 
(NUMOFF); (vi) number of outside blockholders (NUMOUT). Similar to Lins (2003) study, 
tests are carried out independently for each type of inside ownership in relation to firm value 
and performance.  
We then use three main financial measures to capture the effect of blockholder 
ownership on the selected firms’ value and performance: (i) Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q); (ii) 
change in return on assets (ΔROA); and (iii) buy and hold stock returns in excess of the 
S&P500 index return (EXCESS_BHR). The definition of each of these financial measures is 
given in Appendix 1. 
We then run the following multiple regression equation: 
 
                                                                   
                                                               (1)                                                                                                             
where 
             is the unknown intercept for each entity (  entity-specific intercepts); 
               is the dependent variable (DV) where   = entity and   = time; it represents 
either TOBIN_Q, or EXCESS_BHR or ΔROA in alternate regressions.           
  
represents either SUMBLKS or NUMBLKS or the different types of SUMBLKS and 
NUMBLKS in alternate regressions (see Appendix 1);      is the error term.  
We include four control variables (i.e., leverage ratio; tangibility; log total assets; and 
Altman Z score) which are considered to cause an effect on the firm’s performance alongside 
ownership. The leverage ratio is used to control for the financial status of firms since higher 
leverage is expected to mitigate agency costs. Bushee (1998, 2001) uses leverage as a proxy 
for firm risk, in particular, financial distress. Further, Dharwadkar et al. (2008) suggest that 
using leverage as a control measure may limit the extent of risk-taking. This implies a 
positive correlation between leverage and performance (see Jensen, 1986). However, with 
high leverage, there may be a negative effect if there are risks of financial distress and or 
bankruptcy.  
With regard to the association between tangibility and firm valuation, we note that a 
firm with more tangible assets would be viewed as more stable since creditors would consider 
the physical assets as adequate collateral for the loans extended to such firms. In relation to 
firm size, we argue that―compared to a smaller firm―a larger firm necessitates more 
investment for the same level of block ownership. We control for firm size, which is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (see Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001); Dharwadkar et al. 2008). Large-established firms tend not to generate as much 
growth in value as smaller and younger firms. While, Altman’s Z-score is frequently used as 
a proxy for financial distress (see Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), yet it is a composite score of 
several other financial measures and, therefore, captures the effects of quite a few variables 
that would influence firm value and performance. The remaining variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics on the various variables are presented in Table 2. 
To address issues with endogeneity, firstly, we measure our performance variables 
(i.e., TOBIN_Q, EXCESS_BHR and ΔROA) in year  , while the block ownership variables 
  
(i.e., the main explanatory variables) are measured in year    . This setup ensures that the 
ownership variables are measured first, and firm performance is tracked subsequently. As a 
result, the one-year ahead performance measures are unlikely to cause the prior-year 
ownership measures. The time difference between the dependent variable and the set of 
independent variables, to some extent, mitigates concerns about the reverse causality 
problem. 
Second, to capture any unobservable firm characteristics that jointly determine firm 
performance and block ownership, we include firm fixed effects (as will be shown in Tables 
3-6). Third, we test whether block ownership Granger-cause investee firm performance by 
incorporating the lagged company performance measures (as will be shown in Table 7). 
Fourth, we conduct two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with fixed effects and using 
instrumental variables. In the first stage, we use the average turnover in the stock of the firm 
as the instrumental variable to predict block ownership. We argue that average turnover 
proxies for a range of investment behaviors that are due to the costs of transacting stocks as 
well as other factors affecting market sentiment and, as a result, the investment behavior of 
blockholders. Average monthly turnover as an instrumental variable is correlated with 
blockholder investment behavior but less so with the omitted time-varying factors that are 
captured in the error term of the regression of firm performance. In the second-stage 
estimation, we regress firm performance on the fitted values of block ownership estimated 
from the first-stage regression (as will be shown in Table 8). 
Elyasiani and Jia (2010) find that there is a positive relationship between firm 
performance and institutional ownership stability (also see Jafarinejad et al. (2015); Jory et al. 
(2017); Sakaki et al. (2017)). Consequently, we test the effect of the standard deviation in the 
annual block ownership on firm performance. Given that the sample period runs from 1996 to 
2001, we calculate the standard deviation in ownership using the annual figures throughout 
  
all the years. We then test the relationship between the standard deviation estimated at the 
end of the year 2001 (based on the six years annual figures ending in 2001), on the firm 
performance in the year 2002 using the following OLS regression (as shown in Table 9): 
 
                                                                           
                                                                                       (2) 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. To the extent that the stability in block 
ownership adds to firm performance, we expect to find an inverse association between the 
standard deviation in annual block ownership and firm performance. 
 
5. Results and Discussions 
Table 2 reports the mean, median and standard deviation for each category of blockholders 
over the sample period. In Panel A the descriptive statistics of the percentage of ownership 
held by different types of blockholders are presented. The results for standard deviation 
indicate higher fluctuations in the percentages of shares held by outside blockholders relative 
to those owned by insiders. Over the six years, the change in the standard deviation of all 
ESOP-related blockholders is minor; while the change in the standard deviation of shares 
held by other insiders’ groups, particularly affiliated blockholders, is more significant. The 
mean values suggest that outside blockholders hold a higher percentage of shares than 
insiders. Amongst the insiders, the percentage of shares held for officer and affiliated 
blockholders is the highest, while it is the lowest for ESOP-related blockholders and non-
officer directors. These results are consistent with the literature and confirm the assertion of 
La Porta et al (2002) that large blockholders overpower other small shareholders and justifies 
the need to split between the three categories of insiders in order to observe the actual effect 
of each group of blockholders on firm performance (also see Dlugosz et al., 2006). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
  
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the number of blockholders in 
our sample firms. Consistent with the results in Panel A, the number of outsider blockholders 
exhibit higher variation than insider blockholders, while affiliated blockholders and officer 
blockholders dominate the category of insider blockholders. These findings suggest that the 
higher the seniority of insiders, the more shares they tend to hold in a firm. The existence of 
large outside blockholders in our sample is consistent with the view that they are associated 
with reduced agency costs (also see, Schleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Panels C and D of Table 2 present the descriptive statistics of the performance 
variables and the control variables, respectively. The average values of TOBIN_Q and ROA 
are 1.98 and 0.04, respectively (see Panel C). The average values of Altman_Z, total assets, 
leverage, and tangibility are 4.66, 10, 224.95 (in $ millions), 1.41, and 0.31, respectively (see 
Panel D).  Comparing these values to their respective minimum, maximum and the median 
figures, we observe that there are more extreme values in Altman_Z, total assets, and 
leverage and this provides a strong rationale for their inclusion as control measures as in 
doing so it enables us to correctly measure firm performance following Bushee (1998, 2001) 
and Dharwadkar et al. (2008).  
Table 3 reports the fixed effects regressions of the three performance measures based 
on block ownership. The percentage held by all blockholders is positive for all performance 
measures with ΔROA showing the highest association with SUMBLKS. Leverage is 
negatively correlated with each of the three performance measures, while tangibility is only 
positively correlated with EXCESS_BHR. Altman_Z score has a positive effect on 
TOBIN_Q and is negatively correlated with both EXCESS_BHR and ΔROA. This finding 
contradicts the assertion that managers are likely to pursue “myopic investment behavior” as 
a method to fulfill their earning objectives and R&D investment plans in which case we 
would have observed a positive association between Altman_Z and each of firm value and 
  
ROA. On the whole, the results indicate that block ownership is positively related to firm 
value and performance. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
In Table 4 we report the fixed effect regressions of performance measures based on 
each category of blockholder. The results indicate that all types of blockholders are positively 
correlated with TOBIN_Q, and SUMOFF has the highest association with TOBIN_Q 
followed by SUMDIR. SUMOUT and SUMESOP are the least correlated to TOBIN_Q with 
coefficient estimates of 0.005 and 0.004, respectively. The high correlation between 
SUMOFF and SUMDIR with TOBIN_Q compared to other categories of blockholders 
signifies that the seniority of directors is an important factor in enhancing firm value as they 
are directly involved in the firm decision making. To a lesser degree, three types of 
blockholders (i.e., SUMOUT, SUMESOP, and SUMOFF) exhibit a positive relationship with 
EXCESS_BHR. The same applies to ΔROA, although at a slightly higher level of correlation, 
particularly in the case of SUMOUT and SUMESOP, are observed. Unexpectedly, SUMDIR 
shows a negative correlation with both EXCESS_BHR and ΔROA. This could be due to a 
short-termism approach adopted by directors, an approach that yields long-term adverse 
consequences (in Dharwadkar et al. (2008), directors’ pay and performance sensitivity are not 
significantly correlated). Overall, these results confirm our research hypotheses that firm 
performance is positively correlated with different types of block ownership. Also, the extent 
of the effect on firm performance varies across the different types of insider stock ownership, 
with officers and ESOP having a positive impact on all areas of firm performance while 
SUMDIR exerts more effect on firm value.   
  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
  
 
The results based on the number of blockholders (see Table 5) are consistent with 
those based on the percentage of block ownership (see Table 3), i.e., they are positively 
correlated to TOBIN_Q, EXCESS_BHR, and ΔROA. Out of these three performance 
indicators, the accounting performance measure, i.e., ΔROA (with a coefficient of 0.059), is 
the most correlated with the number of blockholders followed by TOBIN_Q and 
EXCESS_BHR respectively. Out of the four control variables used log-total-assets and 
tangibility have the highest correlation with the three performance measures followed by 
Altman_Z and leverage.   
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 6 reports the fixed-effects regressions of performance measures based on the 
numbers of the various types of blockholders. Similar to the results obtained in Table 4 for 
the percentage of blockholders, the numbers for the various categories of blockholders 
exhibit positive correlation with TOBIN_Q with NUMOFF and NUMDIR exhibiting the 
highest coefficients each, i.e., 0.109 and 0.107, respectively. This result supports our third 
hypothesis that firm performance is correlated with officer blockholder ownership and our 
proposition that the seniority of directors is an essential factor in determining firm value. The 
numbers of three types of blockholders, namely NUMOUT, NUMESOP, and NUMOFF are 
positively correlated with EXCESS_BHR while NUMAFLIN and NUMDIR exhibit a 
negative relationship with EXCESS_BHR.  
Only three categories of blockholders (NUMAFLIN, NUMOUT, and NUMESOP) 
have a positive relationship with ΔROA, while NUMDIR and NUMOFF are negatively 
correlated with ΔROA. On the whole, these results confirm our assertion that blockholder 
ownership and firm performance are positively correlated. The exceptions are NUMDIR in 
relation to EXCESS_BHR and ΔROA, NUMAFLIN vis-à-vis EXCESS_BHR and NUMOFF 
  
in respect of ΔROA. Another key finding is that inside blockholders show different degrees 
of correlation with the three performance measures, with NUMDIR and NUMOFF being 
more related to TOBIN_Q while NUMESOP exhibits a higher relationship with ΔROA.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The fixed-effects regressions including lagged dependent variables are presented in 
Table 7. The results are positive and consistent both by percentage and number of 
blockholders across all the three performance measures. SUMBLKS and NUMBLKS show a 
higher correlation with ΔROA compared to TOBIN_Q and EXCESS_BHR.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 Table 8 reports the regressions using 2SLS. Across the four models used, 
blockholders (both by percentage and number) exhibit positive correlation with TOBIN_Q 
and EXCESS_BHR. These results further support our three main research hypotheses that 
blockholder ownership drives firm performance, and they are consistent with the academic 
literature, which argues that firm value and stock returns depend on the the level of stock 
ownership of insiders (Bhagat et al., 2008) and outsiders (Bhagat and Tookes, 2012). 
Leverage and log-assets-total are negatively correlated with TOBIN_Q and EXCESS_BHR; 
tangibility is positively correlated with them; while Altman_Z is positively related to 
TOBIN_Q and negatively related to EXCESS_BHR.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
To the extent that block ownership matters in determining the future firm value and 
both its stock and operating performances, high turnover in block ownership could prove 
detrimental to both the firm’s value and future performance. For instance, if block owners are 
  
wary of the future firm performance, they would look to divest the shares of the firm from 
their investment portfolio. This divestment would prove costly as it could depress the firm's 
share price further and transaction costs would add to the losses suffered by the divesting 
block shareholders. To address this issue, we test the consequences of high volatility in the 
shareholdings of blockholders. We use the standard deviation in the annual shareholdings 
over the sample period to measure volatility in block ownership. We then regress the next 
year's firm performance on the standard deviation in the yearly shareholdings as well as the 
control variables and present the findings in Table 9. We find that the coefficient of the 
variable representing the standard deviation of annual block ownership is negative and 
statistically significant. Economically speaking, high volatility in block ownership acts like a 
bad omen for the firm future performance. It is also possible that the change in ownership 
represents the future outlook of the shareholders, i.e., ownership position was reduced due to 
expected poor performance. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
The key takeaways are as follows: both the number of block owners and the size of their 
shareholdings matter for firm valuation and performance. This relationship is due to the 
economic value of having outside blockholders among the owners of the firm. We find that 
annual firm value and performance are both positively related to the previous year's level of 
block ownership and their numbers. Given the vital role these investors play in the 
determination of firms' performance, a high turnover in their ownership does not look 
favorably on both a firm's future performance and value. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
  
Both the size of block ownership and the number of blockholders are positively related to ex-
post firm value as measured by Tobin's Q, operating performance (as measured by changes in 
return on asset), and stock performance (as measured by the buy and hold stock return over 
and above the return generated by the S&P500 index). These results are robust to firm 
characteristics as well as over time. They are in addition to any time-varying association in 
the performance measures, as well as endogeneity. The standard deviation in the annual 
shareholdings of block owners is inversely related to both firm value and performance. The 
presence of outside blockholders (both in terms of numbers and the size of shareholdings) is 
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Table 1: Distribution of firm-year observations 
Year Freq. Percent Cumulative 
1996 972 14.79 14.79 
1997 904 13.75 28.54 
1998 1,292 19.65 48.19 
1999 1,167 17.75 65.94 
2000 1,156 17.58 83.53 
2001 1,083 16.47 100.00 
Total 6,574 100.00  
The sample period starts in 1996 and ends in 2001. There are 1658 firms generating 6574 
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Variables are defined in Appendix 1. N represents the number of firm-year 





Table 2: Sample Descriptive (continued) 
















































































































































































































































































     



















 (0.002) (0.001) (0.0
29)    
LEVERAGE -0.005 -0.003 -
0.140    
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.1




7.867    
 (0.344) (0.215) (5.3






6    
 (0.063) (0.039) (1.0




0.030    
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.0
58)    




** ** 5.949    
 (0.505) (0.311) (8.2
83)    
Number of firm-year observations 5838 6244 463
1    
Number of firms 1423 1560 135
7    
R-squared 0.127 0.152 0.00
5    
F-stat 63.973 83.669 1.78
5    
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.00
0    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
All independent variables are lagged by a year. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (0.005) (0.003) (0.0





 (0.002) (0.001) (0.0
31)    
SUMESOP 0.004 0.002 0.06
8    
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.1




0.141    
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.1




5    
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.1




LEVERAGE -0.007 -0.003 -
0.128    
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.1




7.591    
 (0.344) (0.215) (5.3
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 (0.063) (0.039) (1.0




0.029    
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.0






5.239    
 (0.507) (0.313) (8.3
11)    
Number of firm-year observations 5838 6244 463
1    
Number of firms 1423 1560 135
7    
R-squared 0.128 0.152 0.00
6    




9    
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.00
0    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
All independent variables are lagged by a year. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
    





    




















 (0.016) (0.010) (0.24
5)    
LEVERAGE -0.003 -0.003 -
0.132    
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.18




7.735    
 (0.344) (0.215) (5.38





1.096    
 (0.063) (0.039) (1.03




0.029    
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.05









6.586    
 (0.501) (0.309) (8.22
8)    
Number of firm-year observations 5838 6244 4631    
Number of firms 1423 1560 1357    
R-squared 0.126 0.152 0.006    
F-stat 63.589 84.046 2.272    
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
All independent variables are lagged by a year. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
    






    
Table 6 : Fixed-effects regressions of performance measures based on the number of 












A    
NUMAFLIN 0.096 -0.012 2.527
**  
 (0.076) (0.047) (1.19





 (0.016) (0.010) (0.25
2)    
NUMESOP 0.049 0.024 0.462    
 (0.107) (0.067) (1.59
9)    
NUMDIR 0.101 -0.023 -
0.729    
 (0.083) (0.051) (1.26
1)    
NUMOFF 0.109 0.026 -
0.016    
 (0.084) (0.052) (1.38
6)    




0.133    
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.18




7.420    
 (0.345) (0.216) (5.38





1.113    
 (0.063) (0.039) (1.03




0.025    
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.05






6.802    
 (0.503) (0.310) (8.25
4)    
Number of firm-year observations 5838 6244 4631    
Number of firms 1423 1560 1357    
R-squared 0.126 0.153 0.008    
F-stat 45.493 60.149 1.900    
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 




Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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All independent variables are lagged by a year. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
       
 






     
Table 8 : Fixed-effects Instrumental Variables regressions 








_BHR    
SUMBL
KS 
0.100*** 0.075***   
 (0.025) (0.017)   
NUMBL
KS 
  1.233*** 0.894*** 





-0.006** -0.027 -0.006*   
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004)    
TANGIB
ILITY 
0.694 0.825** 1.229* 1.241*** 













 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)    
CONST
ANT 
6.464*** -0.866 6.345*** -0.994    
 (1.197) (0.851) (1.482) (1.055)    








1423 1560 1423 1560    
Wald 
chi2(5) 
13530 216 9210 149 
Prob> 
chi2 











Instruments: LEVERAGE, TANGIBILITY, LNAT, ALTMAN_Z, AVG_TURNOVER. 
All independent variables are lagged by a year. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
     
     






Table 9: OLS Regression Of Volatility In Annual Block Ownership 








0.062*   
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.034)    
LEVERAGE 0.011 -0.003*** 0.003*
*  
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)    
TANGIBILITY -
0.361*** 
0.024 0.199    
 (0.110) (0.056) (0.487)    
LNAT 0.050* -0.034*** 0.105    
 (0.026) (0.008) (0.077)    
ALTMAN_Z 0.157*** -0.005* 0.040*
*  
 (0.028) (0.003) (0.017)    
CONSTANT 0.761** 0.451*** -
1.315*   
 (0.318) (0.080) (0.723)    
Number of observations 535 544 544    
R-squared 0.463 0.051 0.014    
Adjusted R-squared 0.458 0.042 0.004    




Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.052    
All independent variables are lagged by a year. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Coefficient estimates are reported. Standard error is reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors 
are used. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
    









Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Percentage held by blockholders (%) 
SUMBLKS Percentage Held by all Blockholders for 
that Firm-Year 
SUMAFLIN Percentage Held by all Affiliated 
Blockholders 
SUMDIR Percentage Held by all non-Officer 
Director Blockholders 
SUMESOP Percentage Held by all ESOP-related 
Blockholders 
SUMOFF Percentage Held by all Officer 
Blockholders 
SUMOUT Percentage Held by all Outside 
Blockholders 
  
Panel B: Number of blockholders  
NUMBLKS Number of all Blockholders for that 
Firm-Year 
NUMAFLIN Number of Affiliated Blockholders 
NUMDIR Number of non-Officer Director 
Blockholders 
NUMESOP Number of ESOP (Employee Share 
Ownership Plans) blockholders 
NUMOFF Number of Officer Blockholders 





Panel C: Performance Variables 
TOBIN_Q (AT + ME - BE)/AT 
ROA NI/AT 
ΔROA (ROA(t) – ROA(t-1))/ROA(t-1) 
BHR 
                              
  
   
    
BHR_SPRTRN 
                                
  
   
 
   
EXCESS_BHR BHR – BHR_SPRTRN 
 




ALTMAN_Z 3.3*(EBIT/AT) +0.99*(SALE/AT) 
+0.6*(ME/LT) +1.2*(ACT/AT) +1.4*(RE/AT) 
TURNOVER Trading Volume/Shares Outstanding on 
a monthly basis 
AVG_TURNOVER Yearly average of TURNOVER 
LEVERAGE (DLTT+DLC)/SEQ where DLTT = 
Long-Term Debt-Total; DLC Debt in Current 
Liabilities-Total 
Panel E: Other Variables 
ME PRCC_C*CSHO 




PREF Either PSTKRV or PSTKL or PSTK 
SEQ Shareholders' Equity 
PSTKRV Preferred stock Redemption Value 
PSTKL Preferred stock Liquidating Value 
PSTK Preferred stock - Carrying Value, Stock 
(Capital) 
TXDB Deferred Taxes  
ITCB Investment Tax Credit  
PRCC_C Price Close-Annual-Calendar 
CSHO Common Shares Outstanding 
SALE Sales/Turnover (Net) 
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
LT Liabilities-Total 
ACT Current Assets-Total 
RE Retained Earnings 
PPENT Property, Plant and Equipment-Total 
(net) 
NI Net Income (Loss) 
AVG_SUMBLKS Average of annual SUMBLKS from 
1996 to 2001 
STD_SUMBLKS Standard deviation in the annual 
SUMBLKS 
Sources of data: 
 Blockholder: Dlugosz J.,  Fahlenbrach R.,  Gompers P.,  Metrick A.. Large Blocks of 
Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement, Journal of Corporate Finance , 2006, vol. 12 
(pg. 594-618), Downloaded from http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html 
 Monthly stock and market returns from University of Chicago’s Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database 
 All financial variables are downloaded from COMPUSTAT. 
 
